If I were a Clico policyholder, I would be forced to admit that there is a very real possibility that the Government may opt to revert to the take-it-or-leave-it posture adopted by Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, at a news conference at the Piarco Airport on her return from her United Nations engagement in New York one month ago. The Prime Minister would be able to say that she has lived up to her promise to consult by mandating the establishment of the interministerial committee led by Agriculture Minister Vasant Bharath. This committee has held very healthy, useful and democratic consultations with the Clico Policyholders Group and others over the last three weeks.
It would be a mistake but the Prime Minister may choose to revert to the take-it-or-leave it posture of the Dookeran Plan for Clico,which may be unconstitutional because it takes away the right to property of the Clico policyholders, as a result of the demands being made on the Government by public servants and the contractors. She may argue that to shift from the zero-coupon policy outlined in the 2011 budget,which must have had the blessing of the Cabinet, would expose the Government to the very real charge that it was favouring the 25,000 Clico policyholders and holders of the Clico mutual funds, who are owed the sum of $12 billion, and ignoring the plight of the public servants and the contractors. She may argue that the financial resources of Trinidad and Tobago, now and in the foreseeable future, do not allow the State to come to an acceptable negotiated agreement with public servants, pay off the Clico policyholders and make good on the Government's debt to contractors (both local and foreign).
She may decide that the State has already contributed $5 billion in bailing out Clico–$3.1 billion in bonds placed on the insurer's balance sheet in February 2010, and $1.9 billion mostly in cash that the company received in March 2009, and that the Government has budgeted to spend a further $3.3 billion on this issue in the 2011 budget. That $3.3 billion comprises $1.5 billion that the Dookeran Plan proposed should be used to pay all policyholders the first $75,000 of their short-term investment products (mostly the Executive Flexible Premium Annuity) and the $1.8 billion that the Dookeran Plan proposed should go into a sinking fund to pay the Clico policyholders the bullet payment on the zero-coupon bond after 20 years. Now, in the 2011 budget speech, the Minister of Finance made the following statement: "As of June 2010, Clico and British American combined total liabilities were approximately $23.8 billion but total assets were $16.6 billion." (The draft Credit Suisse/Milliman report of March 1, 2010, which was first and exclusively reported in this space a couple weeks ago, states that Clico's total assets are worth an estimated $20.4 billion and its liabilities are $22.7 billion–see table).
Mr Dookeran said the liabilities comprised $6 billion owed to holders of 225,000 Clico pensions, traditional life insurance and health insurance and $12 billion owed to holders of short-term insurance contracts (such as the EFPA and mutual funds). It seems to me, from what the Minister of Finance advanced in his budget speech, that Clico has $18 billion in insurance liabilities and $16.6 billion in assets. If one assumed that the Government would want to reserve the $6 billion owed to the holders of long-term insurance contracts, that still leaves, in theory, $10.6 billion with which the holders of shortterm policies and mutual funds can be paid. By my reckoning, if the Finance Minister were correct, the holders of the short-term policies would be able to receive 88.3 per cent of their investments ($10.6 billion divided by $12 billion) based on a managed liquidation, but not a fire sale, of Clico's assets. If the $3.3 billion that the Government has committed to making available to the Clico policyholders in 2011 is added to the $10.6 billion in Clico assets–arrived at after backing out the amount due to the holders of long-term Clico policies–the resulting $13.9 billion would be more than enough to pay off the ALL Clico policyholders.
What's more, the Credit Suisse/Milliman report states that some $4.3 billion in short-term Clico contracts mature in 2010, $4.8 billion next year, $1.2 billion in 2012 and $1.2 billion in 2013. This means that Clico will have to generate $9 billion in cash between now and the end of 2011. If there is a way of treating with the Clico policyholders, what about its other creditors. According to the Credit Suisse/Milliman report, Clico's main non-policyholder or mutual fund liability is borrowings of $1.6 billion–much of which financial institutions would have written down if not off their books. Of course, unlocking Clico's $16.6 billion in assets would mean liquidating Clico. The question then becomes what would Clico be worth if the company's assets and equity were sold off in a managed and programmed way?
First of all, the budget speech refers to the restructuring and merging of the traditional, long-term insurance businesses of Clico and British American and preparing this merged entity for divestment. One assumes, therefore, that if the State were to hive off Clico's traditional portfolio by matching its $6 billion in policyholder liabilities with $6 billion in assets that the resulting entity would be worth at least $6 billion or some multiple of $6 billion, especially if the $2.2 billion in Clico bonds left over from the $3.1 billion were made available to the purchaser. That would account for the traditional policyholders who would as a result be required to pay their premiums to a new company such as Guardian Holdings Ltd, Sagicor or Tatil, each of which may be interested in acquiring the portfolio. It's worthy of noting that the Credit Suisse/Milliman report states that Clico generates net premiums of over $1 billion a year and that 76 per cent of that comes from group pensions.
Secondly, the CS/M report recommends that Clico "should consider the magnetisation of its entire stake in Republic Bank via a strategic sale or IPO" and that a a strategic sale "is the most likely alternative to achieve premium valuation in the short-or-medium term" and that the Government can maximize the premium on the sale by ensuring that the buyer acquires control of the bank by aggregating Clico, CL Financial and Government entities' holdings. Based on a price of $73.49 a share, the report estimates that Clico's 32.3 per cent stake in Republic Bank is worth $3.8 billion but, one assumes, that if the State were to arrange to sell control of Republic Bank that the value of Clico's stake would increase substantially. The report also recommends that the Government should acquire Clico's 56.5 per cent stake in Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Ltd,which was estimated to be worth $4.3 billion as of November 2009, by a transfer from the Heritage and Stabilisation Fund.
If the Government does not have the appetite to buy Methanol Holdings, I am sure that the German minority shareholders would
be prepared to pay a very significant premium to gain control of this complex of methanol, ammonia, urea and melamine plants located in Point Lisas. Some would argue that MHTL has become an extremely valuable asset–made much more so by the fact that it becomes essentially debt free in 2012 and the commissioning of the AUM complex of seven petrochemical plants. The optimum choice, of course, would be to divest MHTL on the local stock market. The sale of Clico's Republic Bank and Methanol Holdings stakes would raise $8.1 billion in cash but would be opposed by many of the Clico policyholders who have this sophomoric notion that they can get the money owed to them AND the insurance company can continue in business. This may prove to be unrealistic. It may end up being either, or. Take it or leave it.
�2 Correction from last week's column: Buckley's is the cough medicine that tastes awful but works, not Robitussin. Thanks to AA and RR for pointing that out.
