On November 24, in piloting the Finance Bill,Finance Minister Winston Dookeran made two extraordinary revelations on the
Clico policyholders issue,which seemed to have been missed by this country's normally vigilant parliamentary reporters and the representatives of the Clico policyholders groups. Speaking about his zero-coupon proposal in which he proposes that Clico policyholders should receive 20 or 21 annual notes representing five per cent of their principal investments in Clico policies, Mr Dookeran said that the policyholders would receive a 10 per cent discount within the first five years. "It was generally agreed that within the first five years the discount rate will average 90 cents to the dollar," said Dookeran, assuring that he had "verbal and written confirmation from the banking community"of that discount.
This means that someone with $1 million in a Clico EFPA would receive $225,000 in the first five years. (That's $1,000,000 divided by 20 years = $50,000 a year, multiplied by 5 years = $250,000 with a discount of 10 per cent = $225,000). But,and this is extraordinary statement number one, Mr Dookeran added: "With respect to the subsequent period of the next 15 years, we are still engaged in discussions with the financial institutions to see what kind of incentives they may wish to have to improve the discount rate."
Now, this last statement raises some very serious questions:
�2 Why is the Government negotiating with financial institutions to provide them with incentives so that they can improve the discount rate offered to policyholders for 15 years, that is, from year six to 20?
�2 Is Mr Dookeran suggesting that because policyholders would receive an average of only 65 cents on the dollar for their investment for 15 years (years six through 20), that he is negotiating with the financial institutions to provide them with "incentives"to improve this "haircut?"
�2 Is it fair and equitable that financial institutions should be provided with "incentives," (which would in effect be a government subsidy) to protect them from interest rate volatility–which is what they would be seeking– and which may end up costing the T&T Government billions of dollars over 15-years?
�2 Is it fair and equitable that Mr Dookeran is prepared to hold discussions with financial institutions "to see what kind of incentives they may wish to have to improve the discount rate,"but refuses to entertain any discussions with the policyholders about incentives to them?
�2 Won't policyholders who opt to hold their zero-coupon bonds for 20 years also be impacted by a volatile interest rate environment, the likelihood that high inflation would erode the value of their savings and that the TT dollar may be devalued some time in the future?
�2 Does Mr Dookeran propose to protect the interest of taxpayers by subsidising financial institutions?
�2 Will Mr Dookeran provide more details to the public about these discussions on the incentives the financial institutions "may wish to have to improve the discount rate."
�2 Does he really intend to serve the national interest by transferring the money saved and invested by those "greedy" policyholders to the poor, long-suffering financial institutions?
As noted previously,without the "incentives" the policyholder with a $1 million EFPA would receive $487,500 for years six through 20. That's 65 per cent of $750,000. All told, therefore, the EFPA policyholder who wants all of his/her investment on day 1 would receive $225,000 for the first five years plus $487,500 for the last 15 years for a grand lumpsum of $712,500. According to my calculations, this means that under the Dookeran Plan, the policyholder who opts to take the money upfront, in a lump sum, rather than run the risk of their investment being eroded by high inflation and negative interest rates,would receive about 72 per cent of their principal; a discount of 28 per cent.
Policyholders who accept this offer would be required, no doubt, to sign away their rights to participate in any profits from the sale of CL Financial assets. It's also important to note that since this is a zero-coupon arrangement, what the policyholders would be agreeing to is a calculated depreciation of their initial principal investment. Mr Dookeran also made this extraordinary statement,which I quote at length to ensure that I am not accused of taking his words out of context: "The argument for the 20-year bonds,let me make it clear, has nothing to do with the issue of the people.It has to do with smoothening the debt curve of the country to ensure that we have a manageable debt situation over 20 years. "The Government is committed to paying $500 million a year for 20 years, to meet this commitment. If we had gone on a shorter term, we would have had to increase it. "If we had gone to 10 years,we would have had to commit ourselves to $1 billion a year for 10 years."
The point the minister is making is that a commitment of $500 million a year over 20 years would be less onerous on the country's annual budgets going forward than a commitment of $1 billion over ten years. But it means, according to our Minister of Finance, that the Government proposes to make direct payments of $500 million from the Treasury for 20 years to the Clico policyholders in order to satisfy the annual payments on the zero-coupon bonds. Now $500 million a year for 20 years is $10 billion. But, if instead of the zero-coupon arrangement, the Government were to settle Clico's 25,000 short-term policy and mutual fund holders by issuing them with a $9.6 billion, 18-month Treasury bill at a discount rate of four per cent, what would be impact on the Treasury?
Four per cent of $9.6 billion is $384 million, which means that at the end of 18 months, the Government would be required to find $10 billion to redeem the Treasury bill. If the $2.2 billion that remains from the bonds worth $5 billion that were issued to Clico in February this year is added to the $10 billion,the $12 billion owed to holders of shortterm Clico policies and mutual funds would be completely satisfied.
Other options available
The challenge for the Government, then, would be for the Government raise the $15 billion it has used to bail out Clico
from the disposal of CL Financial assets in 18 months to ensure that taxpayers are not placed at a disadvantage. Issuing an interest-paying Treasury bill would have the advantage of:
�2 Eliminating the risk of the State providing a subsidy to financial institutions, which could total millions of dollars a year;
�2 Costing the State $380 million in interest payments,for a total,predictable cost of $10 billion in 18 months, instead of the $500 million a year cost over 20 years that has downside risk of the proposed interest rate subsidy to financial institutions;
�2 Completely settling Clico's indebtedness to its policyholders and holders of mutual funds. This would eliminate the threat of a lawsuit that would tie up the sale of CL Financial assets for up to seven years and could lead to the seizure of MHTL by its German financiers;
�2 Giving the State a defined period of 18 months from January 2011 to June 2012 in which to liquidate assets held by CL Financial and Clico,as per the June 12,2009 Shareholders'Agreement between the Government and CL Financial. In that 18-month period, the Government would be able to:
�2 Segregate Clico's $6 billion traditional portfolio of life insurance, health insurance and group policies into a stand-alone entity,which could be sold for at least $6 billion. This sum would go straight into the Treasury to compensate for monies used to bailout Clico;
�2 Squeeze at least $9 billion out of the sale of CL Financial and Clico assets in order to recover the State funds used to bail out Clico, whose stake in Republic Bank alone
would be worth about $4 billion.This would go straight into the Treasury to compensate for monies used to bailout Clico;
�2 Boost investor and consumer confidence in T&T by returning the $12 billion invested in Clico policies to its owners, who
would then have the funds to invest in MHTL and Republic Bank,which would be divested on the local market.
Would the Government go for what seems to be a win-win proposal?
It seems to me that the only way the national interest can be served in this issue is if the Clico policyholder representatives enter into negotiations with the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank,which controls Clico. Both sides must be prepared to make compromises.
Given the risks and cost of litigation, it would be reckless for the Government to maintain its "take it or leave it" approach or its belief that to fully compensate the Clico policyholders would ncourage moral hazard– as seems to be the case from the statement made by Mr Dookeran on November 24: "A haircut is,in fact,part of the scheme, but 'you cannot have no haircut' in this situation. But it is a small haircut, because we have protected,in this measure,the principal. In many countries, Mr Speaker, the principals have not been protected." Why does a haircut have to be part of the solution?
