Dr Margaret Rose
Last week, May 22nd, the Office of Procurement Regulation (OPR) delivered its reasons for terminating a procurement process after the first public hearing of Challenge Proceedings under the recently fully proclaimed Public Procurement & Disposal of Property Act (PPDPPA).
The OPR exercised its power under section 50(10)(e) to stop the North West Regional Health Authority (NWRHA) from awarding a contract for consultancy services for the construction of a multi-purpose facility at the Port-of-Spain General Hospital to Prudecon Ltd.
The OPR stated that the award was terminated “with immediate effect” for failure to meet the objectives set out in section 5(1)(b). The OPR took issue with the fact that the NWRHA, which had originally invited proposals for consulting services for two (the design and construction) stages, proceeded to award the contract for Stage 1 only. The OPR took this decision despite the fact that Prudecon was adjudged the most advantageous tender, by the NWRHA, having scored the highest on general background and organisation, firm experience and on costing (though not the highest overall); and despite the inclusion of a clause in the RFP expressly reserving the right of the public body to cancel the process in its entirety or even partially.
Significantly, the reason given by the NWRHA for only awarding the contract for Stage 1 was that the cost proposals had far exceeded their budgetary allocation for the project under the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) for fiscal year 2024. They argued that not only was it prudent for them not to award the contract for both stages at this time, but that in choosing to award for stage 1 only, their emphasis was on ‘value for money’ and ensuring public confidence in the process.
Apparently, this reasoning was not good enough for the OPR. NWRHA ought to have published a Notice of Cancellation if it made the decision to award only a part of the contract.
Quizzically, the highest-ranked firm that initiated the challenge proceedings CEP Ltd only requested a re-evaluation of the bid, not a termination of the entire procurement process. There were no winners here. Now approximately eight months after the initiation of the procurement process the citizens must continue to await the much-needed multipurpose health facility.
What this case demonstrates is that for public bodies it can no longer be business as usual, and not necessarily in a good way. It is a troubling decision where it appears that the OPR seems to be taking the patriarchal position that public bodies are here to serve the new rules established by the PPDPPA and not that these rules are there to serve public bodies, and ultimately, the people of T&T.
Law can be viewed as a mechanism for designing solutions for a set of social problems. This functionalist perspective informs the inclusion of legislative objectives in new laws against which the effectiveness of a law can be assessed.
In order to understand the PPDPPA and the purpose it was meant to serve, a brief history may be appropriate.
Ever since the scandalous billion-dollar Piarco Airport debacle where politicians and senior public sectors officials were caught nakedly enriching themselves from the public purse, public procurement and the state of its governance have gained starring roles in civil society and political discourses in T&T. Many still lament that despite millions spent on a plethora of investigations including by Canadian forensic accountant Bob Lindquist in 2000 and the Bernard-led Piarco Commission of Enquiry in 2002-2003, our local criminal justice system has netted zero convictions. In fact, were it not for the US courts’ actions in respect of foreign participants, we would not have recovered any of the money.
The promulgation of the new Public Procurement & Disposal of Public Property Act (PPDPPA) in 2015 can be traced back directly to the spark of public outrage at the disclosures emanating from the Piarco Commission of Enquiry in 2002-2003 in which the 167 daily sittings were televised. This catalysed an unprecedented, resilient and powerful partnership between civil society and private sector to lobby the government to create more effective regulation over public officials handling public money. Thereafter followed the 2004 Green Paper consultations on Public Procurement reform spearheaded by the Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry (JCCC) and the Trinidad and Tobago Transparency Institute (TTTI), the Government 2005 White Paper on public procurement reform, the 2006 privately-sponsored draft bill and the 2009-2010 Commission of Enquiry into the Construction Industry and UDeCOTT. This followed by the five-year joint government and civil society committee established to rationalise the new law.
Addressing corruption
Our local movement for public procurement reform has been vigorously promoted in some quarters as a treatment for our corruption affliction. Naively, some may have held the sentiment that once we have the law in place, we will be able to stop and perhaps even catch the “bad actors” in our system.
The PPDPPA is nested within broader systems of public accountability and governance found in the Constitution and including the Exchequer & Audit Act, the Integrity in Public Life Act, the Prevention of Corruption, Proceeds of Crime Act, the Judicial Review Act, Freedom of Information Act and the common law as it relates to, inter alia, fraud, collusion, bid rigging, and misfeasance in public office.
Given the extensive legal avenues for addressing corruption in T&T, the role of the PPDPPA in the fight to eradicate corruption is woefully over-estimated. The lack of law cannot be the culprit for our affliction. It is clearly a problem of enforcement, both in culture and capabilities.
It is this anti-corruption sentiment in public procurement discourses that takes a top-down, rules-based approach to procurement law and embraces a myopic view of sticking to the process rather than allowing for discretion to achieve best value outcomes. The focus is on what we are buying and how we are buying it rather than why we are buying and the complex, multidimensional outcomes we are trying to achieve.
And perhaps it is a misunderstanding of the purpose of public procurement law that could be at the root of the most recent decision of the OPR. Is the purpose of public procurement law to constrain public bodies to comply with a set of rules? Or is there a more fundamental purpose that emphasises the maximising of value for public money within an accountable framework?
What should a public body do, if they find themselves in a predicament where the bids come in over the budgetary allocation, and they have the funds to award only part of a contract, which was already divided technically and financially into two stages? There was no allegation, nor any evidence of corruption or misfeasance on the part of the public body here. There was also no evidence nor finding that NWRHA conducted the evaluations poorly or inappropriately.
Was cancelling the entire project the best way to maximise value for public money? In the absence of allegations of fraud or misfeasance, should it not be in the discretion of the executive management of public resources what projects should start and what projects should be cancelled?
The PPDPPA is a step forward for procurement governance in Trinidad and Tobago. However, the legislative framework is mired in problems. Even the most casual observer, of the almost nine-year process of implementing the 2015 Public Procurement & Disposal of Property regime, will acknowledge what appears to be a growing legislative remorse on the part of the political directorate as evidenced by the successive amendments seemingly geared toward reducing the remit of the OPR.
First reducing the terms of office of the Regulator and members of the board, then exempting several categories of services, then removing government to government arrangements and finally the death-knell with the million-dollar threshold.
Moreover, public suppliers and public sector executives are reporting, inter alia, confusion around pre-qualification and the legal implications of contracting with suppliers not registered on the Procurement Depository, complications around lines of business in the Depository and failure to find suppliers after they indicate they are registered, serious challenges supporting micro-and-small business development, lack of substantive guidance from the OPR (beyond “this is what the law says”), failure of the OPR to approve any special guidelines to date, and actions being taken against Named Procurement Officers with little to no response from the OPR.
These can all be teething problems of a new system or there could be something more fundamentally wrong with the law and its institutional framework in its current iteration. The elephant in the room is, even if the OPR enforces these rules, are these rules fit for purpose? And as importantly, or perhaps more so, given the recent disclosures in the Auditor General’s Report for 2023, is the OPR majoring in minors?
This article is the first in a series entitled ‘Navigating the new procurement regime’ (NNPR)
About the Author
Dr Margaret Satya Rose, is senior partner and head of the governance, procurement & financial crime practice at Lex Caribbean, attorneys at law. Rose holds an LLB (Hons), an LLM in Corporate Commercial Law from the University of the West Indies and a doctorate in policy research and practice with a specialism in public procurement law and policy from the Institute for Policy Research.
margaret.rose@tt.lexcaribbean.com