Last Thursday, in this space, there was a commentary headlined “What does discharge of Maritime injunction mean for Clico’s future?”
That column, it seems, sparked some thinking about the future of the insurance company that was founded by Cyril Duprey in 1936, as the first locally owned insurer incorporated in T&T, according to an August 2020 Central Bank paper titled “Financial section resolutions: Lessons from the Clico, BAT and CIB experience.”
That paper indicates that Clico began operations on June 1, 1937, offering industrial insurance and that by 1946 it “had established branch offices in Grenada, Guyana, Antigua, Barbados, St Vincent, St Kitts and St Lucia with subsidiaries and investments in financial sector businesses, in this country and the Caribbean region.”
As a result of its longevity and resilience—as well as the fact that the company has sold insurance policies to thousands of individuals and companies across this region—Clico is the source of pride and goodwill in this country.
Clico is in a category of local companies that were established decades or centuries ago and are still in operation today, having expanded successfully outside of this country. Similar companies include Angostura Holdings Ltd, set up in 1824, and Republic Bank, founded in 1834.
There are many Trinbagonians who can say that their standard of living is what it is today because a grandparent purchased an insurance policy from Clico, got their first loan from Republic or worked for Angostura. It is not a coincidence that Clico has owned a significant percentage of both Republic Bank and Angostura.
The iconic status of these three local companies —and there are others—may have contributed to a written response to last week’s column.
That letter writer raised, as a question, of whether it is in the national interest for Clico to be allowed to write new business and thereby grow so that its shares become more valuable in the future.
If at some point down the road, the Government chooses to dispose of its 49 per cent shareholding in Clico, then those shares should be sold to the highest bidder or listed on the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange to get the highest return for the taxpayers, the letter writer argued.
“If Clico was allowed to write new business and run for a couple of years before an IPO or sale, wouldn’t you agree that taxpayers can recover more money than what they can recover by selling to Sagicor now?
“I raise the issue of Home Construction Ltd selling its stake in Agostini in 2020. If they had kept the shares, the value of those shares would have nearly tripled,” according to the letter writer.
Cost of liquidation
My initial response to the email from the letter writer was that the national interest lies in Clico/CL Financial repaying the Government, which represents the taxpayers of this country, all of the money that was used to bail out the CL Financial group as soon as possible.
In response to additional points raised by the letter writer, I made the point that the sole purpose of a creditor (Corporation Sole) putting a company in liquidation (CL Financial) is to recover the money owed to the creditor, as soon as possible.
The longer the liquidation exercise takes—it has already taken seven years—the more expensive it becomes. Plain and simple.
The evidence of the fact that liquidations become more expensive the longer they take can be found in the 12th report of the Joint Liquidators to the High Court. That report is on the Grant Thornton letterhead, is dated October 20, 2023, is signed by David Holukoff as joint liquidator, and is for the period January 1 2023 to June 30, 2023.
In the report, the joint liquidators state: “From January 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023, the joint liquidators incurred time costs of US$1,391,288.54 (after a discount of US$902,920) and disbursements of US$59,180.43.”
If the cost of the joint liquidation is US$1.45 million for the six-month period, the cost of 12 months of supervision by the joint liquidators could be US$2.9 million ($19.72 million).
The joint liquidators also disclosed that from the date of their appointment to June 30, 2023, they incurred time costs of US$15,999,507.06 and disbursements of US$718,789.01. In a table in their 12th report, the liquidators state that for the period September 15, 2017, to June 30, 2023, payments totalling $188.95 million were made on behalf of CL Financial. Those payments include:
* Liquidator fees and expenses of $99.47 million, which encompass the period of temporary liquidation;
* Director fees of $7.97 million;
* Legal fees of $35.38 million;
* Professional fees of $12.87 million;
* Wages and salaries of $11.46 million; and
*Valuer fees of $5.39 million.
Given the information outlined above, there is no doubt that the process of liquidation is very expensive. And the process of liquidating CL Financial would have been more expensive had the Government not negotiated a discount on the liquidators’ charges.
Here is what the 12th report states on the issue of the discount:
“On appointment of the joint liquidators, it was agreed that all work completed by them, and their staff would be completed at a discount to their 2017 standard hourly charge-out rates. Those rates have been in place since the provisional liquidation of the company in April 2017 and have not been increased since that date.
“Accordingly, the joint liquidators note they are working on a discount to their 2023 charge-out rates of 44 per cent and have not had an increase in the rates for six years.”
The above information raises several questions about the letter writer’s proposal that Clico be allowed to write new business and “run for a couple of years before an IPO or sale:”
* If it is assumed that Clico would be “run for a couple of years” by its current board—representing the joint liquidators with 51 per cent and Corporation Sole with 49 per cent— then it stands to reason that about US$2.9 million of Clico’s profit would go to the joint liquidators every year?
* Is a board appointed by Corporation Sole and joint liquidators the most appropriate for an insurance company that is seeking to sell new business?
* If Clico were to be allowed to start writing new business, is it envisaged that the insurance company would start from scratch, without its traditional portfolio OR that it would leverage its existing traditional portfolio and build on it?
* If it is assumed that the insurer would attempt to leverage its existing portfolio, what becomes of the agreement, signed on September 30, 2019, to transfer the traditional insurance portfolios of Clico and British American Trinidad to Sagicor Life?
* Is Sagicor Life expected to walk away from that signed agreement, or will it commence litigation against Clico for breach of contract and breach of legitimate expectation (to acquire Clico)?
* What will become of the lawsuit brought by Maritime Life (Caribbean) against the Central Bank, in which the selection process, which resulted in the choice of Sagicor, is being challenged?
Additional issues arise with regard to Clico’s future.
In its 12th report, the joint liquidators place a low value of $3.24 billion and a high value of $6.24 billion on CL Financial assets, as at June 30, 2023.
Given that the joint liquidators estimate that CL Financial’s unsecured creditors are owed between $16.93 billion and $22.69 billion, they project that the most these creditors can expect to receive is $0.35 on the dollar and the least they would receive is $0.13 on the dollar.
With the best will in the world, are those payout numbers likely to change substantially in the next five years?
And is Corporation Sole among CL Financial’s unsecured creditors?
What do readers think is the best path for Clico?
Disclosure: The author of this commentary owns shares in Angostura and Sagicor Financial Company