A 51-year-old man who was sentenced to death for killing his stepson will not face the hangman.
Christna Basdeo, a father of four, will be removed from death row as the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction and death sentence and substituted it with manslaughter. Basdeo will now serve a 15-year sentence for the crime. In a seven-page judgment, the Court of Appeal, comprising Justices Paula Mae Weekes, Alice Yorke-Soo Hon and Rajendra Narine, agreed that Basdeo was not afforded a defence of provocation at his trial. Basdeo was sentenced to death by Justice Herbert Volney in the San Fernando High Court on October 27, 2005, for the murder of his stepson, Kyle Basdeo, on November 10, 2003, at their home at Crystal View, Princes Town.
He was represented at the appeal by Dana Seetahal, SC, and Thristle Khan, while Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Wayne Rajbansie appeared for the State. According to the prosecution's case, Basdeo's wife, Toy, had reported to the police on November 10, 2003, that her husband had planassed her and Kyle with the flat side of the cutlass. PC Rawle Sookdeo went to the home to investigate the report and found Basdeo in an intoxicated state. He cautioned Basdeo and told him to report to the police station when he was sober. After Sookdeo left the house, an argument ensued between the couple that Kyle was not his biological son. It was then that Kyle was chopped to death.
At the appeal, Seetahal said the trial judge erred in dealing with the issue of provocation. She said the judge had misrepresented the evidence of the prosecution witness, Oma Basdeo, in relation to when Basdeo might have discovered that Kyle was not his biological child.
Seetahal argued that the judge effectively excluded from the jury's consideration six other factors which were pertinent to the issue of provocation. The State conceded that this ground had merit and therefore Basdeo was deprived of a proper consideration of the issue of provocation. The State was also of the view that the evidence of provocation was cogent and compelling and therefore the appeal should be allowed on that ground. The Appeal Court had to decide whether it had the jurisdiction to substitute a verdict of manslaughter. Both Seetahal and Rajbansie agreed that in the circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal had the power.
Weekes, who delivered the judgment, said: "We are of the view, as counsel are, that the former course is more desirable. Both the evidence at the trial and the more detailed information coming to this court's attention by way of the probation officer's report, ordered at the appellate stage, convince us that if a jury were properly directed on the issue, there is a strong chance that the appellant would receive the benefit of a verdict of manslaughter in the given premises. "It would thus be a flagrant waste of judicial time to return this matter to a trial court," Weekes added.