Managing the transition between administrations is more complex than it appears. A Cabinet must be constituted, and skillsets matched with the various portfolios to get the best fit. The current transition has also involved the movement of departments between ministries, which created a few errors in the gazetting process.
Government policy is executed through ministries, statutory bodies/agencies and state enterprises (SOEs) and falls under different ministerial portfolios. These entities are governed by different pieces of legislation. Statutory bodies such as PTSC, PATT etc are governed by their own Act.
Civil Service Regulations govern civil servants. SOEs are governed by the Companies Act. Some SOEs are assigned to ministries and the oversight of the minister.
The complication with SOEs is that the Companies Act does not recognise the authority or power of the Minister. Directors have a duty of care to the company and its shareholders, not to the minister or ministry to whom Cabinet oversight is delegated. This creates a legal conundrum.
The confusion between the Public Utilities Minister and the TSTT board has brought to the fore the issue of ministerial control and oversight, lacunae that various administrations have either refused or “neglected” to address. Neither the Companies Act nor the State Performance Manual, the “guidance” manual that addresses the relationship between government and SOE boards, gives any guidance on the matter. However, the convention is that board members offer their resignation to be invoked at the minister’s pleasure.
While SOEs exist for specific purposes, Cabinets often expand these purposes to achieve political objectives. Sometimes these initiatives are government-funded and at other times, company funds are used.
NGC’s expenditure on Train 1 cost hundreds of millions and exposed NGC directors to the possibility that they could be sued in their personal capacity, as it could be argued that such expenditure was not in the company’s interest. The same is true of developing a wastewater plant.
The Companies Act makes directors responsible. If they follow Cabinet directives and the company suffers a loss, they can be held liable when administrations change. The slew of civil cases against former UDECOTT, Petrotrin and ETECK directors exemplifies this risk of reputational and monetary loss.
The Companies Act has been amended to deal with issues of beneficial ownership, but the issue of
ministerial control, oversight, responsibility and liability has never been addressed. This is a critical omission, and every administration has been aware of the lacuna in the law. This is not a trivial matter.
Transfers to SOEs to execute the Public Sector Investment Programme amount to billions of dollars creating the opportunity for wastage and the abuse of power.
The national interest requires that SOEs have boards composed of competent and trustworthy individuals who will pursue the national interest. Board appointments are also a source of patronage or reward to government supporters. Over 500 appointments will be required. Some appointees may not see their appointment as a matter of national service. The oversight mechanisms must be improved.
A wholesale removal of boards may not be in the country’s best interests. If the newly appointed directors are not industry experts, they will need time to settle in and understand the individual SOEs problems and priorities. Valuable time will be lost. Further, not all the previous appointments may have been politically motivated.
While the priority should be viewed as getting on with the job of “government” there should also be a recognition that the system and the law need to be improved.