Over the years I have spent lots of time on social media arguing that the Video Assistant Referee System isn’t fit for purpose. There is of course the usual pushback that the technology allows for the correct decision and everyone should be in favour of having the correct decisions in a football match, especially when the stakes are high.
Social media isn’t the place to really explain the issue and further my main element of this discussion comes from an understanding of how a stock market functions and then applying that insight to what takes place on a football field.
What everyone needs to grasp at the onset is that you can make a decision that abides by the rules and which is correct but if that decision is an arbitrary one it loses legitimacy. Think of the police officer who stops you for speeding while another car is driving faster overtaking you.
At its core VAR is a human designed, selective, technological high resolution review system. Now we will examine whether it makes the sport more legitimate, more consistent and more robust or conversely, whether it creates a more sophisticated form of uncertainty and subjectivity while calling it accuracy.
As a financial consultant, I spend much of my professional life helping people understand the difference between a number and a truth. Financial systems produce numbers all day: prices, yields, spreads, returns, volatility, correlations.
These can be useful but they are also dangerous precisely because they appear scientific. A model can be precise and still be wrong about the thing that matters. That distinction is now central to our discussion.
A useful starting point is the idea of a complex adaptive system. A complex system is not merely something with many parts. A watch is complicated, but it is not complex. Its parts are designed to behave in predictable ways. A complex adaptive system is different. It is made up of interacting agents whose behaviour changes in response to one another. The whole system produces outcomes that cannot be understood by examining the parts in isolation. In these systems the agents adapt their rules and strategies as they interact.
The stock market is the obvious example. A market is not a machine that passively reveals price. It is a living contest among investors, traders, algorithms, regulators, central banks, analysts, journalists, corporate executives and thousands of savers. Each participant responds to prices, and prices respond to participants. The observation changes the thing observed.
A rising share price may attract buyers, which pushes the price higher. A falling market may produce triggers that increases the selling. Liquidity that appears abundant in quiet conditions can vanish under stress. This is why modern financial analysis increasingly treats markets as complex, interconnected systems with feedback loops as opposed to equilibrium machines balancing supply and demand.
Football
Football is also a complex adaptive system. In a match there is a dynamic ecology of players, coaches, officials, crowd pressure, tactical incentives, fatigue, emotion, reputation, time, scoreline and institutional protocol. Every decision changes behaviour. A lenient referee invites more physicality. An early yellow card changes a defender’s risk appetite. A delayed offside flag changes how assistants, defenders and goalkeepers behave. VAR itself changes how players appeal, how referees defer, how coaches complain and how fans experience a goal.
Applying technology is an intervention into a living system. The intervention changes the system.
VAR was introduced to solve a genuine problem. Football is low scoring, so a single incorrect goal, penalty or red card can dominate a match. In risk language, these are tail events: rare relative to the total number of actions in a game, but disproportionately consequential. It is rational to want a safeguard against the catastrophic officiating error.
VAR as a tail risk control system, claims to prevent the worst visible mistakes in the most consequential moments. This sounds good on paper but it also creates the central problem. VAR does not scrutinise football evenly. In practice, the microscope comes out around goals, penalties and red cards, while the larger flow of the match remains governed by ordinary human perception and judgment.
This creates an asymmetry. A foul that prevents a promising attack may disappear into the flow of the match. A smaller infringement by the attacking team seconds before a goal may be forensically examined and used to cancel the goal. The successful attack is audited. The illegally destroyed attack may not be. The system has created two standards of reality: ordinary reality for most of the match, forensic precision for selected decisive moments.
Apreciate that precision is not the same as accuracy, and accuracy is not the same as justice, which is a prerequsite to legitimacy. In football terms, a sensor may answer one narrow question: did the ball register a contact? It does not, by itself, answer the larger questions: was that contact legally relevant, materially significant, consistent with the purpose of the law and proportionately decisive?
A cruder system misses things, so the allure is towards more sensitive technology which also detects more noise. A hyper sensitive system finds things that may have no meaningful footballing consequence. The process forces the development of human designed filters: how large must the signal be, what counts as contact, how is vibration distinguished from touch, how are ball data and player tracking data synchronised? These are not purely technological questions. They are subjective human judgment questions moved into a technical layer.
Football now risks creating a tail risk inside its tail risk control system. VAR was supposed to protect the game from the rare catastrophic error. Now you have the tail risk of a tournament-defining goal cancelled by a microscopic event that no player, referee or spectator experienced as meaningful football. The ruling may be technically defensible and correct under the law as written. Yet it can still damage legitimacy if the sport appears to be governed by invisible technicalities rather than by proportionate, intelligible justice.
Compounding
The issue is not my nostalgia for the old ways but rather system design. In finance, we know that a risk model can reduce one kind of error while creating another. A bank may adopt a model to control losses. But if every institution uses similar risk triggers, the model can force them all to sell at once, amplifying the crisis it was designed to contain. The control mechanism becomes part of the instability. Football faces a similar problem. VAR reduces some obvious refereeing errors, but it can create second order errors: selective scrutiny, inconsistent thresholds, overconfidence in measurement and confusion between technical detection and sporting meaning.
It gets worse because, the inconsistency across matches may be the greatest threat to legitimacy. In a tournament VAR is a human-designed network of expanded officials operating under subjective judgment laden thresholds. One referee allows physical contact; another punishes it. One VAR team sees a clear and obvious error; another sees a decision within the referee’s acceptable range. One official invites an on-field review; another silently checks and moves on. These are all layers of subjectivity and different match teams comes up with different outcomes.
The technology has not eliminated subjectivity. It has compounded and redistributed it. Before VAR, the main subjective actor was the referee. Now subjectivity exists in the original decision, the VAR’s intervention threshold, the choice of replay angle, the use of slow motion or real time, the definition of the attacking phase, the interpretation of contact, the calibration of the technology itself and the final judgment after review.
This creates path dependence. The same penalty box contact can produce opposite outcomes in different matches. If the referee gives a penalty, VAR may decide there is enough contact for the decision to stand. If another referee waves play on for the same contact, VAR may decide the non award is not clearly wrong. In both cases the protocol can be followed.
Across a tournament, the permutations multiply: different referees, assistants, VARs, AVARs, replay operators, camera angles, tournament styles, reputational pressures and match contexts. The result is decision variance hidden beneath the language of technological certainty. VAR in its present form has simply redistributed and compounded the problem it was intended to solve.
It is flawed to see VAR as technological objectivity and accuracy. It is a human designed system with more layers of subjectivity than before.
In complex adaptive systems, more data and technology does not automatically lead to better outcomes. More precision does not automatically mean more fairness. A slow motion replay can reveal truth, but it can also distort judgment if used selectively and without proportion.
Stock markets taught us that long ago. Football needs to learn this lesson now.
Ian Narine is a financial consultant who took extra time to write this column. Please send your comments to ian@iannarine.com
