kevon.felmine@guardian.co.tt
While the Paria Fuel Trading Co Ltd and LMCS argued to absolve themselves of wrongdoing in the deaths of four divers yesterday, expert reports presented at the Commission of Enquiry (CoE) into the Paria/LMCS Diving Tragedy revealed deficiencies in the process and operations of both entities.
Presenting reports from investigations into the February 25 incident at Paria’s offshore facility in Pointe-Pierre, CoE counsel Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, SC, revealed that diving gear and competencies were inadequate when five LMCS divers reported for duty.On February 25, Fyzal Kurban, Kazim Ali Jr, Yusuf Henry, Rishi Nagassar and Christopher Boodram were engaged in subsea repairs on Paria’s 30-inch diameter Sealine 36 pipeline.
It is believed a Differential Pressure (Delta P) incident occurred, which led to the death of Kurban, Ali, Henry and Ali. Boodram is the only survivor and eyewitness.
Paria initially contracted LMCS for the work on Berth 6 at the Pointe-a-Pierre harbour, where the divers got sucked into the pipeline. The divers were working inside a cubed 8×8 feet enclosure known as a habitat, positioned over the pipeline and supplied with positive pressured air from a compressor. It permits divers to carry out underwater work in a water-free environment.
Following the Delta P incident shortly after noon, Boodram crawled through the pipeline to Berth 6, where Ronald Ramoutar and Corey Crawford rescued him.
He reported to his rescuers that the others were alive in the pipeline, and Kurban was just behind him. However, the four other divers remained in the pipeline and were never rescued.
On February 27, Paria revised its rescue efforts and changed it to a recovery operation. Paria recovered Ali, Kurban and Henry’s bodies on February 28 using water displacement. It was not until March 3 that they finally got Nagassar’s body out of the pipeline.
An Occupational Safety and Health Authority (OSHA) report dated April 29, 2022, stated that a risk assessment and job safety analysis done by LMCS were not suitable and sufficient for the task. The report said it did not make provisions for emergencies based on assessing the potential risks of the work. OSHA found that Paria’s planner, Terrance Rampersadsingh, did not have experience in offshore subsea maintenance.
Paria’s maintenance technician, Houston Marjadsingh, also only had seven months experience at Paria. His prior experience was in construction on pipefitting, and he had no background in offshore and subsea maintenance.
Paria HSEQ Lead Randolph Archibald, the custodian of the Permit-to-Work (PTW) procedure, served in various capacities at Petrotrin but did not have offshore and subsea maintenance experience. His team did not have those competencies either.
A review of Paria’s Fire and Response Plan also did not identify and make provision for emergency scenarios based on assessing potential risks in subsea maintenance works.
A report by In-Corr-Tech, commissioned by OSHA, stated that the root cause of the accident was Paria and LMCS’ failure to recognise that a latent hazardous Delta P condition existed because of the methods used in the execution of the works, with particular reference to the removal of fuel oil from Sealine 36. It said if the companies had recognised the Delta P hazard, they could have used simple mitigation steps and changed the work method.
It further stated that Delta P existed at the onset of the work within the habitat and became active when the divers attempted to remove an inflatable plug from the riser. Not being aware of the Delta P condition, incorporating a gasless void, the divers deflated the plug after the safe removal of the mechanic seal. On reaching a deflated pressure of approximately 11.4 psi, the plug’s resistive force was lower than the downward force. Simultaneously, the transient and sudden loss of habitat pressure caused the seawater to rush into the habitat, pouring into the 30-inch diameter riser at the rate of 540 gallons per second at a velocity of 40 ft per second, creating a free vortex entraining all personnel and loose equipment into the riser.
Gravity, habitat, air supply from the compressor, a gasless void and an endless supply of seawater perpetuated the vortex in the riser until the Delta P equalised and the system stabilised.
The Association of Diving Contractor International Inc (ADCI), based in Texas, USA, assessed the operational readiness and safety management of LMCS and the failure of Paria officials and the T&T Coast Guard to respond to the emergency and to effect a rescue operation.
In the July 24 report commissioned by OSHA, the ADCI found that only two LMCS divers had commercial diving certification, while the others had recreational scuba certification, which did not prepare divers for commercial diving. Therefore, those divers were not adequately trained for commercial diving, or, specifically, to perform an operation that involved a Delta P hazard.
It stated that LMCS failed to manage operational safety for dealing with Delta P hazards.
Representing Paria and Heritage Petroleum Company, Attorney Gilbert Peterson, SC, said Paria did not need to have the competencies in subsea maintenance. He said it used a tendering process to hire a contractor with those competencies.
Peterson said LMCS did similar work for Paria in the past. However, he said Paria’s evidence would reveal that LMCS wrongfully departed from its PTW and there was negligence by the company in the execution of works on February 25.
He said the evidence also details the extensive and sustained efforts Paria took to explore feasible solutions to rescue the divers when their safety was LMCS’s responsibility.
Peterson said LMCS was contractually responsible for providing an adequate system, supervision, labour and material to undertake the work.
He said Paria issued several PTWs to LMCS, specifying the required tasks. However, he said Paria was in the dark about the removal of the mechanical and inflatable plugs on February 25, as it did not approve this.
LMCS attorney Kamini Persaud-Maraj argued that no one could execute work in Paria without the approvals of a method statement, a job hazard analysis and a risk assessment.
Persaud-Maraj said there is also a stop policy which allows Paria’s health and safety personnel to stop the work if there is a variation.
“If Paria is saying to this Commission that LMCS is doing something that it ought not to be doing: that is by the removal of the plugs, they were there, they were present, or some member of Paria was present observing the work that was being carried out within the chamber,” Persaud-Maraj said.
