On November 24, 2025, the US State Department moved to designate the so-called Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, a major escalation that treats the group not simply as a criminal network but as a narco-terrorist threat. The designation builds on years of US indictments and sanctions alleging that parts of the Venezuelan military and political elite have been implicated in large-scale drug trafficking and other crimes.
What is the Cartel de los Soles?
The label started as a journalistic and prosecutorial shorthand for drug trafficking networks tied to Venezuelan military officers, the “suns” referring to sun-shaped insignia on generals’ uniforms. Analysts now use the term to describe state-embedded criminality: fragmented but powerful cells of military and security actors who facilitate trafficking, money-laundering, and the illicit extraction of gold and other resources. It is not necessarily a single, tightly commanded cartel in the Mexican-style sense; many experts say it is better understood as a loose, patronage-based set of networks enabled by corruption and impunity.
Is the designation “true”?
Do they exist?
Yes, the activities attributed to the Cartel de los Soles (drug shipments, use of state resources, protection by elements of the security forces) are documented in court filings, sanctions statements and investigative reporting. But there is debate among scholars and investigative groups about whether the phenomenon constitutes a single, monolithic cartel run from the top, or a constellation of criminal actors embedded in state institutions.
The US move reflects a policy choice as much as an empirical judgment. By labelling the network an FTO, the US widens legal tools for sanctions, asset freezes, and interdiction. Critics warn the label risks oversimplifying complex governance corruption problems and raises the political stakes in an already volatile region.
Could there be a presence in T&T?
Short answer, yes ... Venezuelan criminal actors are already active in the southern Caribbean, and T&T has seen growing involvement of Venezuelan networks in narcotics, firearms and human trafficking. Port proximity, maritime routes, and socio-economic vulnerabilities create opportunities for trafficking cells and for collaboration between Venezuelan gangs and local criminals. Importantly, T&T has already taken steps; the country’s courts and authorities have designated the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua a terrorist entity, an acknowledgement that transnational gangs can and do establish operational links across the Caribbean.
Possible impact on homeland security (T&T)
Greater cartel pressure can mean increased maritime smuggling, more sophisticated concealment methods, and spillover violence as transnational groups contest routes and local control.
State-embedded criminal networks exert pressure on ports, customs, and enforcement agencies, a corruption vector that degrades state capacity.
Criminal economies (including illegal mining and exploitation) drive migration flows that traffickers exploit, increasing human-security challenges.
US designations and military activity in the Caribbean can raise tensions with Venezuela and complicate bilateral relations and joint operations, requiring careful diplomatic navigation.
What should intelligence and homeland security do? (practical, prioritised actions)
Expand coastal radar, AIS monitoring, maritime patrols and information-sharing with regional partners and US counternarcotics assets. Prioritise detection of low-profile go-fast boats and irregular landings.
Use financial intelligence to trace laundering, cross-border cash flows, and illicit gold routes. Freeze or monitor suspect commercial entities, freight brokers and informal cash-for-gold channels.
Institute stricter vetting, anti-corruption rotations, and integrity checks for port officials, customs and border personnel. Corruption is an enabling factor, reduces the points of compromise.
Build HUMINT networks in diaspora communities and amongst fishermen; offer protected reporting channels so local informants can safely pass trafficking intelligence.
Deepen intelligence sharing with Caribbean neighbours, the US, Colombia and Interpol. Use anti-terrorism and anti-money-laundering laws judiciously to target leadership and logistics while protecting civil liberties.
Invest in economic alternatives, coastal community policing and social programmes to reduce the labour pool for traffickers and recruiters.
We need to be realistic, not alarmist
The Cartel de los Soles, as a label, captures real criminal phenomena, trafficking networks with ties to state structures. Whether it is a single “cartel” or a fragmented set of corrupt networks, the security consequence is the same for T&T: increased exposure to drugs, weapons, human exploitation and political pressure.
The right response combines sharper maritime and financial intelligence, anti-corruption safeguards, regional cooperation and community-level resilience. Treat the designation as a red flag, an urgent signal to close vulnerabilities, not a reason to panic, but a call to act methodically and lawfully.
