Dr Winford James
On the last occasion, Max Albert and I postponed our promised BATNA discussion to divert to the recent provocative airfare imbroglio. That diversion, however, was not entirely unrelated.
In many ways, the airfare controversy was itself a small window into a larger constitutional problem: Tobago’s enduring dependence upon central arrangements over which it exercises little decisive control. A ferry, an airbridge, a subsidy—these are never merely logistical questions. They are more properly constitutional questions disguised as transportation policy.
This week, we return to the larger issue. We examine Tobago’s BATNA and WATNA in the event of failed negotiations over Tobago’s constitutional future. BATNA—Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement—asks the practical question: what is Tobago’s best available alternative course if there is no agreement with Trinidad on meaningful constitutional restructuring? And WATNA—Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement—asks the darker question: what is Tobago’s worst-case position if negotiations fail or produce an inadequate settlement?
These concepts, made famous by the book Getting to Yes, are usually discussed in labour relations, commerce, and diplomacy.
We begin by noting that Tobago’s constitutional journey may be one of the Caribbean’s longest-running BATNA/WATNA exercises. Long before the language existed, Tobago’s thinkers were already living it.
It started long before the contributions from men we are more familiar with – men like James Biggart, APT James, British-born planter Isaac Hope, Dr Winston Murray, and, more significantly, ANR Robinson. It goes all the way back to the debates among Tobago’s planters and debates in Britain about how to address the collapse of Tobago’s sugar economy in the period leading up to 1884, and to the British solution to that problem up to 1898. The later contributions of Biggart et al came in the context of that debate about the British solution and deepened the island’s thinking on autonomy.
ANR Robinson, in particular, transformed Tobago’s constitutional philosophy into institutional architecture.
The re-establishment of the Tobago House of Assembly in 1980 was historic. But let’s be honest: it was recognition, not resolution. While the re-establishment acknowledged Tobago’s distinctiveness and specialness, it did not settle Tobago’s authority. That would begin in earnest with the amendments of Act 40 of 1996.
For most of us sitting in that chamber at the time, there was a high expectation that the Fifth Schedule represented a constitutional leap. And indeed it did. Tourism. Agriculture. Planning. Infrastructure. Environmental management. Development. All appeared closer to home.
But constitutional reality remained elusive. It turned out that, while the Assembly could exercise function, it could not offer finality.
For those who detract, there is a profound difference between those two ideas. You can have function without sufficient authority, especially if “sufficient” translates as final in practical terms. But we must not continue to allow that to happen since it would be a case of conditional governance. And, as we all know, conditional governance is dependency.
We come now to the present, where the nation has once again been promised a new Tobago autonomy bill. The matter has been publicly reactivated under the leadership of Chief Secretary Farley Augustine, and, from the Trinidad end, seems to be led by Professor Hamid Ghany.
It is reasonable to think that both sides of the political divide are putting their perspectives together, even if they are yet to engage the country as a whole. Quietly, but urgently, people are asking questions such as the following: When will we hear the voices of seasoned Tobagonian thinkers? When will a body of the latest ideas and directions as to the way forward be put before our imaginations? What is the shape of the concern about ensuring the constitutional future of the Tobagonian Child? When would the Tobagonian Child be able to say yes?
This bill that must come must not fail or under perform in any way because Tobago’s bargaining position could be weakened for decades. Which brings us back to BATNA. What is Tobago’s BATNA if negotiations fail or the bill disappoints? Its BATNA must be political and constitutional regrouping. It includes reorganising public consensus, rebuilding intellectual unity, clarifying Tobago’s requests /demands with precision, and pressing democratically and without hostility for self-government.
That is Tobago’s BATNA. What is its WATNA?
Its WATNA is more dangerous than many realise. It is accepting a weak autonomy settlement under the appearance of brotherhood. Or a constitutional shell. Or a symbolic autonomy. Or an arrangement that looks empowering but preserves dependency. That may be worse than delay.
We must pull Tobago out of the stasis and ambiguity in which it is trapped. In the meantime, the economies of the region are moving. Guyana is expanding aggressively. Grenada is positioning itself strategically. Barbados continues to deepen institutional sophistication. And a reopening Venezuela may alter regional economic calculations.
Time is moving. Capital is moving. Opportunity is moving. But is Tobago? That is the underlying constitutional issue. And BATNA and WATNA force us to face it honestly. For if Tobago does not define its constitutional alternative clearly, history will define it for us.
A bad autonomy bill may be more dangerous than no autonomy bill at all, for while a bad autonomy may bury the struggle under a constitutional illusion, no autonomy would keep us locked in stasis and uncertainty for generations to come.
Dr Winford James is a retired UWI lecturer who has been analysing issues in education, language, development and politics in Trinidad and Tobago and the wider Caribbean on radio and TV since the 1970s. He has also written thousands of columns for all major newspapers in the country.
