DR HAMID GHANY

As the is­sue of con­sti­tu­tion­al re­form con­tin­ues to at­tract much pub­lic in­ter­est and de­bate, one of the fun­da­men­tal ar­eas of de­bate that is emerg­ing is the role of the in­di­vid­ual Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment as a con­stituen­cy rep­re­sen­ta­tive. This mat­ter con­tin­ues to gain at­ten­tion as peo­ple re­al­ly would like to see their MPs func­tion­ing as a CEO of their con­stituen­cy in re­spect of the pro­vi­sion of goods and ser­vices. The re­al­i­ty is, how­ev­er, that this is not so. In­di­vid­ual MPs do not have a bud­get for their con­stituen­cies and they are re­al­ly there to pro­vide "rep­re­sen­ta­tion" as op­posed to "man­age­ment". How­ev­er, there ap­pears to be a dis­con­nect be­tween the ex­pec­ta­tions of peo­ple and the mea­sure­ment of per­for­mance of their MPs. There are many peo­ple who gen­uine­ly be­lieve that in a par­lia­men­tary sys­tem that the MP can make things hap­pen be­cause there is some di­rect con­trol of re­sources to make things hap­pen, when the truth is that the MP is at the mer­cy of min­istries, gov­ern­ment de­part­ments, agen­cies and re­gion­al cor­po­ra­tions.

Those MPs who hap­pen to be Min­is­ters are per­haps bet­ter placed than oth­er MPs who do not hold any po­si­tions in the ex­ec­u­tive branch of Gov­ern­ment. The per­for­mance of the MP in many in­stances is mea­sured in the pub­lic do­main by the num­ber of times the MP for an area can have his/her ac­tiv­i­ties pub­li­cised in the me­dia as op­posed to those who are not for­tu­nate to have such cov­er­age. There are many MPs on both sides of the House who keep their of­fice hours re­li­gious­ly for their con­stituents, but they do not have me­dia cov­er­age to go with it. Per­haps, one of the keys to this puz­zle is the is­sue of vis­i­bil­i­ty as many mem­bers of the pub­lic are usu­al­ly quite quick to say that they have nev­er seen their MP since the elec­tion cam­paign. This ought not to be too dif­fi­cult for MPs to arrange, as an out­reach pro­gramme in their con­stituen­cies can bear fruit. Where they will have dif­fi­cul­ty is in in­stances where there is lit­tle or no de­liv­ery of goods and ser­vices at the re­quest of the MP.

Those MPs who are Min­is­ters will tend to have a more dif­fi­cult time as they have to bal­ance their min­is­te­r­i­al time with their time in the Par­lia­ment and their time in the con­stituen­cy. There has been much talk about the in­tro­duc­tion of the North Amer­i­can tech­nique of the right of re­call. In seek­ing to in­tro­duce a Wash­ing­ton-mod­el tech­nique in­to a West­min­ster-adapt­ed sys­tem there will be prob­lems that need to be ad­dressed. The first of these is the fact that the MP is usu­al­ly cho­sen by the par­ty when stand­ing for elec­tion as a can­di­date. In the Unit­ed States, where this mod­el is most like­ly be­ing copied from, most state rep­re­sen­ta­tives run in pri­ma­ry elec­tions and their can­di­da­cy is a func­tion of win­ning the sup­port of reg­is­tered vot­ers with­in their par­ties. This al­lows them some mea­sure of in­de­pen­dence af­ter they get elect­ed to put the is­sues of their dis­tricts ahead of their par­ties.

That is not how this will work if this re­form is in­tro­duced here. The MP will be ex­pect­ed to toe the par­ty line, once elect­ed, and if he/she de­vi­ates from that di­rec­tive, then a re­call mech­a­nism can be ac­ti­vat­ed against them. It should al­so be not­ed that trade unions will be able to use this against Min­is­ters who are in­volved in ne­go­ti­a­tions with their min­istries and op­pos­ing par­ties can use it in or­der to get a sec­ond bite at the prover­bial cher­ry. If this mech­a­nism is to func­tion in a man­ner that is fair to all sides, then there has to be a clear sep­a­ra­tion be­tween the MP and his/her abil­i­ty to be ap­point­ed a Min­is­ter. If this does not hap­pen, then those MPs who are al­so Min­is­ters may find that their po­lit­i­cal en­e­mies will use it as a tool to desta­bilise the Gov­ern­ment. This is so be­cause in a par­lia­men­tary sys­tem the ex­ec­u­tive func­tions on the ba­sis of ma­jor­i­ty con­trol and dom­i­nance of Par­lia­ment.

In the pres­i­den­tial-style sys­tem from where this is be­ing copied, the ad­min­is­tra­tion of a state gov­er­nor will not fall if there are sev­er­al dis­trict rep­re­sen­ta­tives who are re­moved by way of re­call. In seek­ing to es­tab­lish a greater sep­a­ra­tion be­tween elect­ed MPs and the pos­si­bil­i­ty of min­is­te­r­i­al ap­point­ments aris­ing there­from, there will have to be some em­brace, whether di­rect­ly, grad­u­al­ly or on a hy­brid ba­sis, of pres­i­den­tial­ism. This can still be ac­com­plished if the ti­tles of the Prime Min­is­ter and Min­is­ters are to be kept. How­ev­er, min­is­ters may have to be cho­sen from out­side the House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives if the de­sire is to have the MP serve on­ly as a con­stituen­cy rep­re­sen­ta­tive and par­lia­men­tar­i­an and not as a Min­is­ter in the ex­ec­u­tive branch. That kind of con­sti­tu­tion­al change will beg the ques­tion about the next step be­ing a mod­i­fied pres­i­den­tial one even if it is not called by that name. But, if peo­ple want their MPs to serve them alone and not the par­ty or the Gov­ern­ment, then the choic­es are lim­it­ed.