Three Commonwealth Caribbean countries have had constitutional reform reports delivered this year, and all three of them have come down on the side of retaining the parliamentary system of government.
Extracts from the three reports convey these recommendations as follows: “5.1.7 Having carefully weighed the strengths and weaknesses of both systems of government, the CRC recommends that the parliamentary cabinet system be retained.” (Jamaica: Report of the Constitutional Reform Committee, May 2024).
“5.102 The Cabinet should remain collectively responsible to Parliament but with an enhanced regime of accountability through Committees and other mechanisms of oversight.” (Trinidad and Tobago: Report of the National Advisory Committee on Constitutional Reform, July 2024).
“6.8. The Commission recommends that the existing constitutional provisions relating to the Cabinet be retained and that additional provision be made in the new constitution for a Code of Conduct for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.” (Barbados: Report of the Constitutional Reform Commission, September 2024).
In all three instances, the desire to retain the parliamentary system by having the Cabinet continue to be collectively responsible to Parliament is very clear. The reform comes with proposals for the strengthening of accountability mechanisms which are intended to impose on the Executive more demands of accountability in the hope that the political culture will change to allow for greater transparency and accountability.
Not much will change with these proposals as the political system has been hardwired since independence. According to Dr Eric Williams in an address, before he became Chief Minister of T&T, in Woodford Square on July 19, 1955:
“Ladies and Gentlemen, I suggest to you that the time has come when the British Constitution, suitably modified, can be applied to Trinidad and Tobago. After all, if the British Constitution is good enough for Great Britain, it should be good enough for Trinidad and Tobago.” (Eric Williams, Constitution Reform in Trinidad and Tobago, Teachers’ Educational and Cultural Association, Public Affairs Pamphlet No 2, 1955).
Premier Norman Manley told the Jamaican House of Representatives on January 24, 1962: “Let us not make the mistake of describing as colonial institutions which are part and parcel of the heritage of this country. If we have any confidence in our own individuality and our own personality we would absorb these things and incorporate them into our being and turn them to our own use as part of the heritage we are not ashamed of.” (Proceedings of the Jamaican House of Representatives 1961-62, January 24, 1962, p 766).
These words still resonate today as their intent demonstrates the deep-seated desire to retain the parliamentary system of the colonial power, Great Britain. In the case of Williams, it was the adoption of a suitably modified version of the British parliamentary system. In the case of Manley, it was the maintenance of the colonial evolutionary process of identifying the institutions of the colonial era as belonging to us and not to them.
Interestingly, all three reports are determined to keep the parliamentary system, and they make attempts to modify it by using techniques from the US presidential system to strengthen committees, etc. The underlying reality is that the current constitution reformers have no desire to break from the colonial past and usher in a bold new approach to doing business fundamentally differently.
The hold of the British colonial institutional framework is very strong, and it is embedded into our psyche as the only way to govern. The prospect of effecting a genuine separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature, whereby the Executive can no longer control the Parliament will not come with this latest round of constitution reforms.
Fundamental systemic reform will pass us by again. Our political culture has been nurtured to cling tenaciously to the words of Williams and Manley to make the parliamentary system ours.
On the judicial side, there is a call for the adoption of the CCJ to complete “the cycle of independence,” while on the Executive/legislative side, there is the call to retain the colonially inspired parliamentary system.
Barbados has the CCJ already, while the current Jamaican Government does not want it, and the parliamentary arithmetic in T&T cannot be overcome between the Government, which wants it, and the Opposition that does not.
Regardless of all the imported US presidential techniques about oversight committees, there is still only one vote for the electorate to choose the Parliament. The Executive will still be selected from the legislature instead of the voters having a separate vote for the Executive. That would be real reform that would break the colonial inheritance and end the real prime ministerial “concentration of power” that exists in the parliamentary system.
Prof Hamid Ghany is a Professor of Constitutional Affairs and Parliamentary Studies at The University of the West Indies (UWI). He was also appointed an Honorary Professor of The UWI upon retirement in October 2021. He continues his research and publications and also does some teaching at The UWI.