The Government’s decision to establish 30 joint army-police posts across Trinidad and Tobago is, on the face of it, a welcome response to the country's crime problem.
More visible security can deter criminal activity, reassure communities and allow the protective services to respond more quickly.
The Government says the posts will be established over the next four months, with 24 locations already identified.
They include interchanges, junctions, community spaces and rural areas, from Tarouba and Grand Bazaar to Icacos, Toco, Guayaguayare and Mayaro.
As expected in a heavily sensitive political climate, there has already been pushback over some of the locations chosen, with some commentators noting an imbalance between the number of posts allocated to UNC constituencies as opposed to PNM constituencies.
The central question, however, should be whether these 30 posts are in the right 30 places to deal with the national crime problem, regardless of what constituencies they are in.
This is where the Government needs to provide greater clarity.
Trinidad and Tobago recorded 369 murders in 2025, the lowest total in a decade, compared with 625 in 2024.
The crime problem, however, remains geographically uneven.
In 2025, the Central Division recorded 73 murders, the highest of all divisions, followed by the Northern and Southern divisions.
Port-of-Spain, which recorded the highest divisional total in 2024, was fourth in 2025.
That should tell us something important: crime moves.
By July 20 this year, the country had recorded 213 murders, compared with 220 for the same period in 2025.
While that is encouraging, it is still a modest 3.2 per cent reduction in killings.
The location of the new posts, therefore, cannot be determined by political constituencies, population size or where residents have requested greater visibility.
Take Mayaro, for example.
The constituency is receiving a joint post, with Guayaguayare among the identified locations. There is nothing inherently wrong with strengthening security in rural communities.
But what of Los Iros, which has had a long history of illegal migrant arrivals and remains strategically important from a border-security perspective?
Just last month, a pirogue carrying 29 Venezuelan migrants capsized off Los Iros, leaving two people dead.
There are, therefore, more compelling reasons to give this vulnerable coastal corridor priority over other areas.
The same scrutiny should apply to communities that have endured persistent gang violence.
Enterprise, Laventille, Beetham, Morvant and parts of the East-West corridor have repeatedly featured in the country’s crime stories, and foreign travel advisories continue to identify several of these areas as particularly affected by gang activity.
There is also historical precedent for questioning how these posts are used.
In 2013, concerns were raised after police posts in East Port-of-Spain had been removed and a new joint army-police post was proposed. Residents argued that the earlier posts had helped restore calm.
The lesson is not that every community needs a permanent armed presence, but that security infrastructure must follow evidence.
Government can put some of these concerns to rest by outlining the methodology used to select the 30 locations, including murders, shootings, firearm seizures, gang activity, response times, population, border vulnerability and other relevant indicators.
The locations should also be reviewed quarterly, and if crime shifts, the posts should also shift.
The initiative is certainly a good step which all law-abiding citizens should support, but ultimately its success would depend on the extent to which it is a data-driven plan.
