Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s announcement on Wednesday that a diplomatic delegation will travel to Caracas signals a cautious reopening of a relationship that has drifted from cooperation into tension.
This is not a new beginning. Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have been engaged in nearly two decades of stop-start negotiations over cross-border gas, dating back to early talks in 2003 and formalised agreements in 2007.
The question, therefore, is not whether talks will resume, but why, after so many cycles of engagement and collapse, success has remained so elusive.
At the heart of the issue lies a familiar paradox. T&T and Venezuela are natural energy complements: one possesses infrastructure, processing capacity and established markets; the other holds vast, largely untapped gas reserves.
That logic drove the early vision of cross-border cooperation, particularly in the Loran–Manatee and Dragon fields. But what should have been a model of regional integration has instead become a case study in how geopolitics can distort even the most rational economic partnerships.
The deterioration in relations in recent months has been decisive. This country’s alignment with United States policy during Venezuela’s political crisis fundamentally altered the diplomatic equation.
For Caracas—under both Nicolás Maduro and now Delcy Rodríguez—T&T is no longer viewed as a neutral neighbour, but as part of a wider geopolitical bloc. As a result, agreements have stalled and energy cooperation has been recast as leverage rather than partnership.
That tension defines the present moment. Relations remain cold, transactional and highly sensitive to political signalling. There is a perception—firmly embedded in Caracas—that key decisions are shaped elsewhere.
However, economic reality is forcing both sides back to the table. T&T’s gas shortages are now acute, constraining LNG output and downstream industries. For Venezuela, monetising offshore gas offers a relatively low-cost route to revenue. These overlapping interests explain why negotiations, however fraught, never fully collapse.
There are also signs of a more favourable environment. The Rodríguez administration has shown greater openness to foreign investment, while the United States has selectively eased sanctions to allow limited energy cooperation. Major firms such as Shell and BP have re-entered discussions, effectively driving momentum from the commercial side.
Diplomacy is no longer the sole engine of progress—corporate timelines and market pressures are now equally influential.
But this introduces a critical constraint. Any meaningful agreement will exist within a tripartite framework involving Port-of-Spain, Caracas and Washington. US Office of Foreign Assets Control licences remain decisive, and their volatility ensures that even the most carefully negotiated deal can unravel quickly.
That reality makes a return to the integrated model of the past—embodied in the 2010 unitisation agreement—unlikely. What is emerging instead is a more fragmented, project-by-project approach. The Dragon field appears the most viable candidate for near-term progress, while more complex arrangements such as Loran–Manatee will require delicate renegotiation.
After nearly 20 years of intermittent talks, the lesson is clear. The barrier has never been geology or economics. It has been politics.
The prospects for renewed cross-border gas arrangements are therefore real, but conditional. Talks will proceed, agreements may be signed, and some projects could advance. But their success will depend less on diplomatic intent than on geopolitical alignment and regulatory stability.
