TREVOR SU­DAMA

The unan­tic­i­pat­ed pass­ing of the no-con­fi­dence mo­tion brought by the PPP/Civic Op­po­si­tion in Guyana against the AP­NU/AFC coali­tion Gov­ern­ment as a re­sult of an MP of the AFC vot­ing with the Op­po­si­tion has raised some is­sues of the na­ture of rep­re­sen­ta­tive de­mo­c­ra­t­ic pol­i­tics as well as con­se­quences for con­sti­tu­tion­al and po­lit­i­cal out­comes in Guyana.

As re­gards de­mo­c­ra­t­ic rep­re­sen­ta­tion, the first ques­tion that needs a re­sponse is what are the du­ties and re­spon­si­bil­i­ties of a rep­re­sen­ta­tive in Par­lia­ment. One may sur­mise that the pri­or­i­ty oblig­a­tion is to faith­ful­ly rep­re­sent the in­ter­ests, con­cerns, wish­es and as­pi­ra­tions of his/her con­stituents and to do so by ob­serv­ing the oath of of­fice which, in the case of T&T, is to up­hold the Con­sti­tu­tion and the law and to do right by all man­ner of men with­out fear or favour, af­fec­tion or ill-will. The oath, there­fore, im­plies that the rep­re­sen­ta­tive’s du­ties’ should be car­ried out dis­pas­sion­ate­ly, with in­tegri­ty and con­sci­en­tious judg­ment and in con­for­mi­ty with the law.

In the case of the first-past-the-post elec­toral sys­tem, the con­stituents are de­fined by ge­o­graph­i­cal bound­aries as is the case in T&T where­as, with re­spect to pro­por­tion­al rep­re­sen­ta­tion, as im­ple­ment­ed in Guyana, the con­stituents may be ex­tend­ed to in­clude all those who vot­ed for the par­ty which se­lect­ed the rep­re­sen­ta­tive.

In both sys­tems, how­ev­er, a rep­re­sen­ta­tive in Par­lia­ment is gen­er­al­ly elect­ed through as­so­ci­a­tion with or sup­port of a po­lit­i­cal par­ty. In fact, in many ju­ris­dic­tions, it is as­sumed that it is the par­ty’s sup­port which is the dom­i­nant fac­tor in the elec­tion of a MP. There­fore, the mem­ber is deemed to have an oblig­a­tion to the par­ty on whose tick­et he/she suc­cess­ful­ly en­tered Par­lia­ment.

That oblig­a­tion may en­com­pass ad­her­ence to the par­ty’s rules and con­sti­tu­tion and sub­scrip­tion to its poli­cies and pro­grammes both in and out of Par­lia­ment. In fact, in some ju­ris­dic­tions, laws have been passed re­quir­ing a mem­ber to va­cate his/her seat in the event that he/she re­signs or is ex­pelled from the par­ty on whose tick­et the mem­ber con­test­ed and won the seat. The jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for such pro­vi­sion in the law is that there is need to main­tain a mea­sure of par­lia­men­tary sta­bil­i­ty for both the rul­ing par­ty and gov­ern­ment as well as for op­po­si­tion par­ties and to pre­vent ram­pant in­di­vid­u­al­ism, po­lit­i­cal op­por­tunism, and in­con­sis­ten­cies in rep­re­sen­ta­tion.

On the oth­er hand, one of the con­se­quences of laws which in ef­fect pre­scribe obe­di­ence to par­ty di­rec­tive is that the free­dom of ac­tion and ex­pres­sion of rep­re­sen­ta­tives is cir­cum­scribed and some ar­gue that it is in­im­i­cal to the spir­it of rep­re­sen­ta­tive democ­ra­cy. Some lead­ers have placed a pre­mi­um on par­ty loy­al­ty to even sti­fle dis­sent. Oth­ers have de­clared ad­her­ence to the prin­ci­ple of par­ty para­mount­cy. Many have ar­gued that strict com­pli­ance with par­ty po­si­tions and poli­cies con­verts or­di­nary mem­bers and rep­re­sen­ta­tives to ci­phers and syco­phants.

In­deed, some­times it is a sad sight to see men and women dis­pense with their pride, in­de­pen­dence, and crit­i­cal fac­ul­ty so as not to de­fy the par­ty which in ef­fect means the lead­er­ship. This is done in or­der to pre­serve their seats in Par­lia­ment or their po­si­tions in Gov­ern­ment.

Clear­ly, there will be oc­ca­sions when an MP con­sci­en­tious­ly dis­agrees with the ma­jor­i­ty view of the par­ty and the po­si­tions and poli­cies adopt­ed by it. There will be oth­er oc­ca­sions when there is ir­rec­on­cil­able con­flict be­tween an MP’s du­ty to his con­stituents and his oblig­a­tion to sup­port par­ty poli­cies and di­rec­tion. A con­flict­ed MP may raise his/her ob­jec­tions and dis­agree­ments in­ter­nal­ly and seek to per­suade the ma­jor­i­ty. If he/she is un­suc­cess­ful, then there are two op­tions avail­able—ei­ther to sup­press one’s own opin­ion and judg­ment and go along with the po­si­tion of the ma­jor­i­ty or pub­licly pro­claim dis­agree­ment and dis­sat­is­fac­tion and face the con­se­quences. When and how an MP choos­es to make the re­bel­lious po­si­tion pub­lic re­sides in his/her dis­cre­tion.

In the case of MP Char­ran­das Per­saud, he chose the oc­ca­sion of a no-con­fi­dence vote against the Gov­ern­ment of which his par­ty was a mem­ber to make his op­po­si­tion pub­lic. He would have known the enor­mous con­se­quences of his ac­tion. There could have been the im­mi­nent col­lapse of the Gov­ern­ment, a con­sti­tu­tion­al im­broglio and the pos­si­ble call­ing of na­tion­al elec­tions. He would al­so have an­tic­i­pat­ed the vi­o­lent re­ac­tion of his erst­while par­lia­men­tary col­leagues some of whom re­sort­ed to ex­ple­tives, threats, and vo­cif­er­ous con­dem­na­tion.

It is dif­fi­cult to ac­cu­rate­ly as­sess the mo­ti­va­tion which im­pelled Char­ran­das Per­saud to make his mo­men­tous de­ci­sion. Did he feel that his views were ig­nored and dis­missed as a sup­port­er of the Gov­ern­ment or did he be­lieve that his con­stituents (AFC vot­ers) were dis­en­chant­ed and even be­trayed by the poli­cies of the Gov­ern­ment? As a con­se­quence did he see it as his du­ty to ex­press that dis­en­chant­ment pub­licly which trumped his oblig­a­tion to the par­ty?

(To be con­tin­ued)