Last week, we not­ed that Sin­ga­pore used the same fis­cal tools in their de­vel­op­ment process, but with five key vari­a­tions. First, its poli­cies were bet­ter co­or­di­nat­ed and aligned, as it fo­cused on a na­tion­al de­vel­op­ment per­spec­tive rather than on macro­eco­nom­ic man­age­ment alone. Sec­ond, the same po­lit­i­cal par­ty has been in pow­er since Sin­ga­pore’s in­de­pen­dence. This has al­lowed for a con­sis­tent ap­proach with changes in tac­tics, if not strat­e­gy. Third, its pol­i­cy frame­work has nev­er been com­pro­mised by any ex­ter­nal in­ter­ven­tion. Fourth, rig­or­ous ad­her­ence to mer­i­toc­ra­cy in its pub­lic ser­vice and state in­sti­tu­tions has fa­cil­i­tat­ed pol­i­cy-re­in­forc­ing so­ci­etal be­hav­iours. Fifth, or­gan­i­sa­tion­al dis­ci­pline was a key fea­ture of gov­ern­ment and state en­ter­pris­es, en­sur­ing pol­i­cy con­nec­tiv­i­ty and align­ment, cre­at­ing an en­abling en­vi­ron­ment for achiev­ing de­vel­op­ment goals.

There were two ad­di­tion­al vari­a­tions. Sixth, al­though Sin­ga­pore had a mul­ti-eth­nic pop­u­la­tion (25% In­di­an, Malay, and oth­ers), it was pre­dom­i­nant­ly Chi­nese (75%). Its mul­tira­cial mix has re­mained sta­ble with slight shifts due to im­mi­gra­tion. In 2025, its res­i­dent pop­u­la­tion re­mains main­ly Chi­nese (73.9%), Malays (13.5%), In­di­ans (9.%) and Oth­ers (3.5%). How­ev­er, it recog­nised its mul­ti-racial, mul­ti-eth­nic and mul­ti-cul­tur­al ori­gins, hence the em­pha­sis on mer­i­toc­ra­cy and equal ac­cess to ed­u­ca­tion. Even though Dr Er­ic Williams em­pha­sised ed­u­ca­tion as a force for up­lift­ment, this has not had the same im­pact. Fur­ther, the dif­fer­ences in racial com­po­si­tion did not al­low one par­ty to re­main in pow­er, as in the case of the Peo­ple’s Ac­tion Par­ty in Sin­ga­pore.

As a re­sult, the pol­i­tics of the two coun­tries var­ied sig­nif­i­cant­ly, lim­it­ing Williams’ or any oth­er leader’s ca­pac­i­ty to achieve so­cial co­he­sion for a pro­longed pe­ri­od. The re­volv­ing door of ad­min­is­tra­tions be­tween 1986 and 2015 demon­strates this in­sta­bil­i­ty and the close­ness of elec­toral out­comes, ce­ment­ing the eco­nom­ics of re­dis­tri­b­u­tion and the de­pen­dence on the en­er­gy sec­tor to fa­cil­i­tate that re­dis­tri­b­u­tion. The 1970 rev­o­lu­tion epit­o­mised the view that “the im­pov­er­ished In­di­an and ne­gro mass­es” had not ben­e­fit­ed from in­de­pen­dence. The fo­cus on quick re­turns en­sured that the pro­ceeds of the oil boom of 1974 to 1985 were not well di­rect­ed. The 1990 in­sur­rec­tion en­sured that re­dis­tri­b­u­tion eco­nom­ics would pre­vail.

Vic­tim­hood and en­ti­tle­ment be­came en­trenched, and the pop­u­la­tion was no longer amenable to na­tion­al ap­peal. Sim­i­lar­ly, the unions have pig­gy­backed on this trend so that wage ne­go­ti­a­tions are not based on pro­duc­tiv­i­ty. Na­tion­al de­vel­op­ment is based on the no­tion that cit­i­zens are part of the build­ing process and that re­wards will be shared ac­cord­ing to pro­duc­tiv­i­ty and ef­fi­cien­cy. This process is not al­ways even. How does a gov­ern­ment get con­sen­sus and sol­i­dar­i­ty be­hind a plan that in­volves cit­i­zen sac­ri­fice to­day for long-term ben­e­fit to­mor­row? This is al­so re­flect­ed in our na­tion­al schol­ar­ship sys­tem, where the best and bright­est at­tend the best uni­ver­si­ties abroad, and most do not re­turn to do na­tion­al ser­vice.

The sev­enth and per­haps most cru­cial fac­tor is the en­force­ment of the law and the need to stop cor­rupt prac­tices with pub­lic mon­ey. Po­lit­i­cal par­ties rou­tine­ly ac­cuse each oth­er of cor­rup­tion and pay lip ser­vice to an­ti-cor­rup­tion mea­sures. Yet no lead­ing politi­cian ever goes to jail or is con­vict­ed. An in­com­ing ad­min­is­tra­tion of­ten ini­ti­ates civ­il cas­es (not crim­i­nal cas­es) against di­rec­tors of state en­ter­pris­es to em­bar­rass rather than pun­ish wrong­do­ing. The Ude­cott case is an ex­cel­lent ex­am­ple of po­lit­i­cal games­man­ship that is des­tined to fail and has so far on­ly yield­ed one scape­goat. Sim­i­lar­ly, the In­tegri­ty Com­mis­sion is un­der-re­sourced and used as a po­lit­i­cal foot­ball, with no re­sources to con­duct in­de­pen­dent in­ves­ti­ga­tions. Like­wise, the Pro­cure­ment reg­u­la­tor’s re­port in­di­cates sig­nif­i­cant non-com­pli­ance and in­dif­fer­ence to reg­u­la­to­ry di­rec­tives. Un­less se­nior pub­lic of­fi­cials are made to ac­count, an­ti-cor­rup­tion will not take root.

In con­trast, Sin­ga­pore’s suc­cess in con­trol­ling cor­rup­tion be­gan in 1959, well be­fore in­de­pen­dence. It was de­lib­er­ate, in­sti­tu­tion­al, well-de­signed, and sup­port­ed by cred­i­ble en­force­ment and clean in­cen­tives over sev­er­al decades. The an­ti-cor­rup­tion agency, the Cor­rupt Prac­tices In­ves­ti­ga­tion Bu­reau (CPIB), is in­de­pen­dent. It falls un­der the prime min­is­ter’s aegis and has the pow­er to in­ves­ti­gate any pub­lic of­fi­cial, with broad search, seizure, and ar­rest pow­ers.

The bur­den of proof is re­versed, mean­ing that of­fi­cials must ex­plain their source of wealth. Un­ex­plained wealth can be ev­i­dence of cor­rup­tion. Gifts or favours are treat­ed as bribes un­less ex­plained oth­er­wise. The penal­ties are se­vere and in­clude prison, fines, and as­set con­fis­ca­tion. In­ves­ti­ga­tions are con­duct­ed quick­ly and re­port­ed wide­ly, sham­ing of­fi­cials pub­licly, elim­i­nat­ing dis­cre­tion and opac­i­ty. In­sti­tu­tion­al strength helped shape and re­in­force pos­i­tive be­hav­iours by pub­lic of­fi­cials, shap­ing cul­ture.

To com­ple­ment this ap­proach to cor­rup­tion, item five, or­gan­i­sa­tion­al dis­ci­pline in pub­lic or­gan­i­sa­tions and state en­ter­pris­es, is key. There are clear, rule-based pro­ce­dures in li­cens­ing, cus­toms, hous­ing, and pro­cure­ment with lim­it­ed room for vari­a­tion. Fees for pub­lic ser­vices are stan­dard­ised, and emol­u­ments and en­ti­tle­ments are well known. State en­ter­pris­es are al­so man­aged for prof­itabil­i­ty through a hold­ing com­pa­ny, the Temasek Cor­po­ra­tion (net port­fo­lio val­ue USD $325 bil­lion at March 31st, 2025), whilst they align with gov­ern­ment eco­nom­ic pol­i­cy goals. They are man­aged on an arms-length ba­sis, mean­ing that pub­lic of­fi­cials (min­is­ters or civ­il ser­vants) do not in­ter­fere in op­er­a­tional man­age­ment.

Mov­ing the coun­try on­to a new de­vel­op­ment path, away from the en­er­gy sec­tor as the en­gine of dis­tri­b­u­tion, re­quires a cred­i­ble and com­pre­hen­sive gov­ern­ment ap­proach if it is to change cit­i­zens’ be­hav­iour and out­look. Be­ing trans­par­ent and clear in ne­go­ti­at­ing with pub­lic-sec­tor em­ploy­ees is an es­sen­tial first step in this process.

Mar­i­ano Browne is the Chief Ex­ec­u­tive Of­fi­cer of the UWI Arthur Lok Jack Glob­al School of Busi­ness