A key argument for an efficient public service is that an efficient service would provide the basis for a competent government to achieve positive results. These positive results should translate into improved outcomes that would benefit voters’ pockets and be reflected in successful communities. Voters would then vote for the incumbent party since it performed well in office. Using this criterion, every political party should have a vested interest in ensuring that the civil service is up to the task of managing the government apparatus.
The Cabinet’s role is to determine and approve the policies to be pursued by a government during its term in office. However, implementation of the policy is the responsibility of the civil service. The interface between cabinet policy and the civil service is the line minister through his relationship with the permanent secretary. It should be noted that a permanent secretary has a multifunctional role. The first is to supervise the operations of the ministry and is therefore the chief accounting officer. But this role also requires the permanent secretary to guide and advise the minister in effecting cabinet-approved policies within the framework of the legislation governing the public service (eg, Public Service Regulations, Audit and Exchequer Act, Pensions Act, etc). The minister has no power to hire and fire civil servants.
Parliament provides the oversight function. This oversight is exercised through the relevant parliamentary committees and the questions posed to ministers. In practice, this role is limited, and the Executive (the Cabinet) has a wide latitude. If the Government apparatus is not achieving the desired results, there must be reasons for this underachievement. There are a few broad possibilities that could account for this underachievement.
First, there could be a people problem. Either the skill sets of elected officeholders are unsuited to developing the policy framework, or the civil service personnel are unequal to implementing the policy framework. A second possibility could be that the supporting administrative systems are not calibrated to address the challenges created by changing circumstances. Since nothing is ever completely wrong, the third possibility is that there could be deficiencies in the policies adopted, of the people executing the policies, or the administrative systems need improvement.
Several governments have adopted their campaign manifestos and platform promises as government policy. Implementing the policy framework documented in a political manifesto has inherent limitations. Often manifesto pledges are not subject to rigorous analysis to determine their technical, operational or financial feasibility before coming into office. Further, these policies are set in broad terms to give an administration wriggle room in accounting for the success or failure of these policies.
Some policies have a long gestation period, and their implementation may require more time than one electoral cycle. In addition, these policies will require cooperation between different ministries. This adds complexity to the implementation process. One example was a proposal to provide pensions for people attaining the age of 60 years. Other examples include the implementation of the Trinidad and Tobago Revenue Authority and the Property Tax. Another would be the attempt to improve the turnaround time for construction projects (public or private) without improving the operational capacity of the Town and Country Planning Division.
Critical to the success of any plan or programme is the existence of clear priorities, agreed timelines, and the alignment of objectives and a monitoring framework.
Part 2 of this series compared the Cabinet Secretary’s role and function under the Westminster system with the role of the Head of the Public Service. It concluded that the term “Head of the Public Service” in the T&T context has no official coordinating role and is not an establishment position. It suggested that in the absence of such a coordinating role, there is the opportunity for dysfunctionality, delays, duplication, wastage and inconsistent delivery.
No one commenting on the article either disagreed or refuted this hypothesis, so it must have some validity. I am also guided by my discussions with the deceased Reginald Dumas on this matter. He confirmed that the head of the public service may be able to influence other permanent secretaries but has no formal authority to force another officer to follow his directions.
It could be argued that the coordinating role should belong to the Prime Minister, who is in effect responsible for the performance of his Cabinet ministers. Who follows up on the implementation of cabinet decisions? How and when are these cabinet decisions reviewed and their success or failure evaluated? What data is used to perform these evaluations? How is the performance of a minister to be judged, and what are the key metrics that would enable this evaluation process? How often and when should these evaluations take place? Is there an administrative structure to gather the data and complete a matrix to make such determinations? Does this evaluation process take place in individual ministries? These are difficult questions. How is one to analyse a government’s performance on specific objectives rather than broad generalisations? Since permanent secretaries are in effect divisional chief executives, the questions apply equally to them. There is no official coordinating role or mechanism at the civil service level. Accordingly, there will be huge variations in performance as the objective circumstances will vary between ministries.
Should there not be a formal established position or office whose incumbent performs, inter alia, this critical coordinating function?
Mariano Browne is the Chief Executive Officer of the UWI Arthur Lok Jack Global School of Business.
